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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL KATHLEEN THROCKMORTON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 870400-CA 
Category 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2)(g). Defendant/appellant appeals the 
Memorandum Decision of the District Court entered July 30, 
1987 modifying the Decree of Divorce entered in the Third 
District Court September 30, 1976. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did plaintiff meet her burden in establishing a 
substantial and permanent change of circumstances sufficient 
to justify the trial court's modification of the Divorce 
Decree? 
2. Did the trial court adequately consider the 
Paffel criteria prior to awarding plaintiff alimony? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
awarded plaintiff alimony in light of the equities of this 
case? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on or about on May 27, 
1955. During the course of the marriage eight children were 
born as issue of this couple. The youngest child was born 
March 26, 1968. (R.2) 
2. Plaintiff filed for divorce on August 11, 1976. 
(R.2) Defendant signed an acceptance of service and consent 
to default. (R.9) 
3. On September 13, 1976 the court entered a Finding 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. (R.9-15) 
4. The Decree of Divorce provided that defendant pay 
$85.00 per month as child support for a total of $425.00 per 
month for the support and maintenance of the minor children. 
(R.10, 11) 
5. The Decree awarded plaintiff $1.00 per year as 
alimony. (R.10, 11) 
6. The Decree awarded plaintiff the parties home 
subject to the mortgage payments, all the household 
furnishings and fixtures. (R.10,11) Plaintiff realized a 
gain of $24,000 in equity on the home when it was sold in 
1983. (TR.5)(R.15-16) 
7. Defendant was ordered to pay all obligations to 
creditors the parties incurred during the course of the 
marriage. (R.ll) The total amount of marital debts was 
$12,000. (R.82) 
-2-
8. At the time of the divorce defendant was employed 
as a police officer with Salt Lake City. Defendant made 
$19,040 in 1976. (TR. 20) 
9. Plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the 
divorce. (R.136) 
10. Plaintiff filed a petition to modify on January 
7, 1980. The petition sought an increase in child support to 
$150 per child and an increase in alimony to $150 per month. 
(R.17-18) 
11. On May 13, 1980, the court made Findings of Pact 
and Conclusions of Law denying plaintiff an increase in 
alimony because plaintiff failed to demonstrate a change in 
circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in alimony. 
(R.54) 
12. At the time of modification defendant made 
approximately $23,500 annually and plaintiff made $690.92. 
(R.53-54) 
13. Plaintiff again filed a petition to modify the 
Decree of Divorce on September 26, 1986. (R.60-61) The 
petition alleges as a change of circumstances. Plaintiff 
alleged medical problems prevented her from working. (R.136) 
At the tirae the petition to modify was filed defendant had 
retired and had a gross annual income of $18,970.00. (R.129) 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. On September 30, 1986, plaintiff filed a petition 
to modify the Decree of Divorce previously entered on August 
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11, 1976. The petition sought a share of defendant's 
retirement and an increase in alimony from $1 to $500 per 
month. (R.66-68) 
2. Defendant answered and filed a motion for summary 
judgment with memorandum of law addressing all issues. 
(R.79-118) 
3. Plaintiff responded to defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. (R.121-125) 
4. This matter came on for hearing on July 16, 1987, 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. (R.127) Both 
parties were present and represented by counsel. The Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
5. On July 30, 1987, the Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision denying plaintiff's request for a share of 
defendant's retirement and granting plaintiff's request for 
increased alimony. Alimony was increased to $396.00 per 
month. (R.128-130) 
6. Defendant appeals the Court's Memorandum Decision 
and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law awarding 
plaintiff increased alimony. (R.133-134) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it found 
that there was a substantial and permanent change in 
circumstances for the parties when defendant's income 
substantially decreased from the time of divorce until the 
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time of modification ten years later and plaintiff was 
unemployed at the time of divorce and at the time of 
modification. Moreover, plaintiff provided insufficient 
evidence to establish that her medical problems permanently 
prevent her from obtaining employment. Plaintiff's petition 
to modify should have been dismissed for failure to prove 
substantial and permanent change in circumstances. 
The trial court award of alimony of $396.00 per month 
is unsupported by the evidence because the Court failed to 
consider the Paffel criteria prior to awarding plaintiff 
alimony. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
Specifically, the Court failed to adequately consider 
plaintiff's ability to provide for herself and defendant's 
ability to pay. In the event this Court finds that there has 
been a substantial change in circumstances, the case should be 
remanded for specific findings under Paffel. 
Finally, the trial court abused its equitable 
discretion in awarding plaintiff alimony in light of the 
divorce decree which awarded plaintiff $24,000 equity in the 
home and required defendant to pay $12,000 in marital debts. 
Additionally, the parties have lived separate lives for ten 
years and defendant has remarried, retired, and is living on 
less income than when the parties divorced. The trial court 
failed to adequately consider all the equities of this case 
when it awarded plaintiff alimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
PERMANENT CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING REOPENING THE 
DIVORCE DECREE. 
A party seeking a modification of a divorce decree 
must demonstrate to the Court below that a substantial change 
in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the decree. 
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). The 
change in circumstances must also be permanent before the 
court can reopen the divorce decree. Keisel v» Keisel, 619 
P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980). 
A party appealing a modification of a divorce decree 
must demonstrate that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against a finding of substantial change of circumstances or 
that the trial court has abused its discretion. Thompson at 
362. 
In the case at hand the trial court abused its 
discretion because there has been neither a permanent nor a 
substantial change in circumstances since the divorce decree 
was entered. When the divorce decree was entered in 1976, the 
plaintiff was unemployed and the defendant was employed as a 
police officer making $19,040 per year* At the time of the 
modification was filed in 1986, plaintiff was unemployed and 
defendant had remarried and retired on an income of $18,970 
per year. Since the Supreme Court determined that the effects 
of inflation can be taken into account when determining 
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whether there has been a change in circumstances, Wiker v. 
Wiker, 600 P.2d 514,515 (Utah 1978), and when taking into 
account the effects of inflation from 1976 to 1986, 
defendant's income has substantially decreased. 
In determining whether there has been a change in 
circumstances, the Court also considered the plaintiff's 
medical condition* (R.136) Specifically the Court found that 
"plaintiff is unemployed now and is unable to obtain gainful 
employment due to medical problems." (R.136) 
Defendant respectfully submits that there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to establish that 
plaintiff's medical condition constitutes a substantial and 
permanent change in circumstances to justify modification. 
The only evidence of medical conditions is a proffer of her 
testimony as to the nature of her condition. (TR. 6, lines 
14-22) There is no evidence whatsoever to establish that the 
medical problems cannot be corrected with treatment or that 
they are permanent or that they permanently prevent plaintiff 
from obtaining gainful employment. 
The record thus indicates that there is no testimony 
as to why the plaintiff's afflictions make it impossible for 
her to obtain employment. In fact, the plaintiff has been 
unable to obtain employment as supervisor of Clerks at the 
District Court in Las Vegas. (TR. 36, lines 4-10) Moreover, 
defendant has remarried and his income has decreased since the 
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divorce while plaintiff's income remained substantially the 
same. As such the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial 
and permanent change in circumstances. The Court abused its 
discretion when it found that plaintiff established a 
substantial and permanent change in circumstances. Based upon 
defendant's decreased income, plaintiff's case should be 
dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF 
FACT UNDER PAFFEL TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently set forth what 
factors must be considered by the trial court when it awards 
alimony. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
Specifically these factors are, (1) the financial conditions 
and needs of the spouse claiming support, (2) the ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income for him or herself, 
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide the 
support. 
Regarding findings of fact in Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) the Court stated: 
Failure of the trial court to make findings on 
all material issues is reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. 
Acton at 999. 
The failure of the trial court to make specific 
findings was recently considered by this court in the case of 
Marchant v. Marchant, 66 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App. 1987). 
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In Marchant, the trial court in Finding 8 disallowed alimony 
without explanation. In Finding 10 the Court set forth the 
monthly income of the parties. As this Court held, the 
findings were insufficient to establish plaintiff's financial 
conditions and needs, her ability to provide sufficient income 
for those needs and defendant's ability to provide support. 
Id. at 49-50. 
Applying Marchant to this case supports the 
conclusions that the findings are insufficient to support an 
award of alimony. The relevant findings are Findings 7 and 
8. Findings 7 states that the plaintiff is unemployed and is 
unable to obtain gainful employment because of medical 
problems. Finding 8 indicates that defendant has a gross 
income of $1584 per month. Unlike Marchant and Paffel, there 
was no testimony as to plaintiff's or defendant's monthly 
expenses. 
As previously discussed in Point I, defendant objects 
to Finding 7 as being unsupported by the evidence. 
Additionally, Finding 7 fails to address plaintiff's needs. 
Finding 8 states defendant's gross income but fails to 
indicate whether the Court considered defendant's ability to 
pay. In summary there is little or nothing in the record to 
support an award of $396.00 per month as alimony. The Court 
specifically failed to address the Paffel factors in reaching 
its decision on alimony. 
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As required by Paffel and Marchant, this case should 
be remanded for specific consideration of the Paffel factors 
and to consider such additional evidence as is necessary for a 
proper determination. An issue that specifically needs to be 
addressed is the effect on alimony and equities between the 
parties of plaintiff's receipt of $24,000 in 1983 from the 
sale of the home. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS EQUITABLE DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING PLAINTIFF ALIMONY. 
The decision of the Court in awarding alimony is 
based upon principles of public policy and equity. The 
overiding public policy concern is to "enable the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 
397 (Utah App. 1987) , citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 
100 (Utah 1986). 
The analysis does not stop here however. 
Modification of a decree to provide for alimony is an 
equitable matter. The Supreme Court implicitly recognized 
this in Paffel when the Court indicated that the financial 
condition of the receiving spouse and the ability to pay of 
the paying spouse are at issue. Additionally, as in any 
equitable proceeding, equitable maxims assist in determining 
an equitable outcome. With these factors in mind, the 
equities of this case weigh against an award of alimony. 
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The original divorce decree awarded plaintiff inter 
alia, the home, and the defendant was ordered to pay $500 in 
child support and to pay the bills of the marital estate. 
The defendant paid over $12,000 in bills and 
diligently paid child support when due. In 1983, plaintiff 
sold the home realizing a $24,000 cash gain from the sale. 
Defendant remarried, purchased a trailer and retired in 1983. 
Now the plaintiff comes to Court seeking permanent 
alimony after the parties have lived apart for ten years. 
Although unclear from the record, shortly after receiving the 
$24,000 on the home, plaintiff quit her job as supervisor of 
Clerks at the District Court in Las Vegas and has apparently 
spent the $24,000. Defendant continued working until eligible 
for retirement. 
It is now inequitable for the plaintiff to seek more 
money from the defendant due to her own lack of frugality and 
diligence in managing her financial affairs by awarding 
plaintiff alimony. The trial court is now punishing defendant 
for his own conservative financial management and rewarding 
plaintiff for her lack thereof. 
Defendant respectfully submits that at some point 
after the couple has been divorced and the children are grown, 
in this case ten years after divorce, equity requires a 
finality or at least a cap on the financial ties created by 
the divorce. Upon retirement defendant should be entitled to 
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some predictability in his financial matters. Defendant has 
taken care of his children, remarried and moved on with his 
life. He is making less money now than he made when the 
parties were divorced ten years ago. Under these facts the 
trial court abused its equitable discretion in reopening this 
divorce decree and awarding plaintiff alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above cited reasons, defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court dismiss plaintiff's petition. In the 
alternative, defendant requests that this matter be remanded 
to the District Court for further consideration of the Paffel 
criteria. 
DATED this day of November, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Nolan J. Olsen, Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 8138 South State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047 on 
this _2i£iTdaY o f November, 1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^HA, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'O 
GAIL KATHLEEN THROCKMORTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-23347 
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Petition, 
filed on the 30th day of September, 1986, to modify a divorce 
Decree entered on the 13th day of September, 1976. The plaintiff 
requests: (1) that she be awarded fifty percent of the 
defendant's retirement that was accrued during the marriage, 
being from May 27, 1955 to September 13, 1976, and was not 
addressed in the divorce Decree; (2) in the alternative, for an 
increase in alimony based on a change of circumstance. The Court 
finds: 
1. That plaintiff knew of the retirement account at the 
time of the divorce, and failed to bring it before the Court. 
2. That even if the plaintiff didn't realize she could 
receive a share of it at the time of the divorce, she failed to 
raise it in 1980 at the time of a modification hearing, and 
waited until 1986, that being over ten years. 
THROCKMORTON V. THROCKMORTON PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
3. That plaintiff was not employed at the time of the 
original Decree, but was capable of working and earning money. 
4. That plaintiff was employed in 1980 at the time of a 
modification hearing. 
5. That the parties' children have all reached their 
majority, and the defendant is no longer paying child support. 
6. That plaintiff and defendant were married for 21 years, 
and the plaintiff was awarded $1.00 per year alimony, but no 
appreciable amount of alimony has been paid to her. 
7. That plaintiff is not employed now, and is unable to 
obtain gainful employment because of medical problems. 
8. That defendant has retirement income of $18,970.00 per 
year, or $1,584.00 per month. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes and Orders: 
1. That plaintiff's request to modify the Decree of 
Divorce and award her a share of the defendant's retirement 
account be denied on the grounds of res ajudicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
2. The Court does find there has been a change of 
circumstances, and Orders the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $396.00 per month as alimony. 
Dated this vQ day of July, 1987. 
|H(bMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
THROCKMORTON V. THROCKMORTON PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of July, 1987: 
Nolan J, Olsen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8138 S. State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Defendant 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Nolan J. Olsen (2464) 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047-3299 
Telephone: (801) 255-7176 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL KATHLEEN THROCKMORTON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. D-23347 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce having come on to 
be heard before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the 21 day of May 1987, 
the plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Nolan J. Olsen, and the 
defendant appearing in person and by his attorney Robert M. Mcrae, and the 
plaintiff and the defendant having proffered evidence to the court, and the 
plaintiff having testified, and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff requested that she be awarded fifty percent (50%) 
of defendant's retirement at Utah State Retirement for the period of May 27, 
1955 to September 12, 1976, the date of the Decree of Divorce, which retire-
ment was not addressed in the Decree of Divorce, or, in the alternative, for 
an increase in alimony, based upon a change of circumstances. 
2. The court finds that plaintiff knew of the retirement account 
at the time of the divorce, and failed to bring it before the court. 
3. That plaintiff testified that she did not realize she was 
entitled to receive a share of said retirement at the time of the divorce 
Throckmorton FFCL 2 
and, likewise, she did not realize she had a right at the time in 1980, when 
she requested a modification for child support, and that she waited until the 
30th day of September 1986, a period of ten years, prior to commencing the 
modification hearing requesting an award of a portion of the retirement, 
based upon her years of marriage. 
4. That plaintiff was not employed at the time of the original 
Decree of Divorce, had eight children, and was incapable of working and 
earning money. 
5. That plaintiff was employed in 1980, at the time of the 
modification hearing. 
6. That all eight children have now reached majority, and 
defendant is paying no child support to the plaintiff. 
7. That plaintiff and defendant were married for 21 years, and 
plaintiff was awarded $1 per year as alimony by way of the Decree of Divorce 
and no other alimony has been paid to her. 
8. That the plaintiff is not now employed, and is unable to obtai 
gainful employment because of medical problems. 
9. That defendant has retirement income of $18,900 per year, or 
$1,584 per month. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Faxt, the court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff's request to modify the Decree of Divorce 
and award to her a share of the defendant's retirement account be denied 
upon the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
2. The court finds there has been a substantial change of cir-
cumstances, and orders defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of$396 per 
month as alimony, commencing in August 1987. 
Dated this /^\ day of September 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
F. WILKINSON, Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on this 10 day of September 1987, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
oi Law, postage prepaid to*. 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Defendant 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
O/H 
-A 
"V 
** ^ % 
Nolan J. Olsen (2464) 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047-3299 
Telephone: (801) 255-7176 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL KATHLEEN THROCKMORTON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CECIL DEE THROCKMORTON 
Defendant 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. D-23347 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce having come on to 
be heard before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the 21 day of May 1987, 
the plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Nolan J. Olsen, and the 
defendant appearing in person and by his attorney Robert M. McRae, and the 
plaintiff and the defendant having proffered evidence to the court, and the 
plaintiff having testified, and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for the plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff's request to modify the Decree of Divorce and 
award plaintiff a share of defendant's retirement at Utah State Retirement 
Fund be, and the same is hereby denied, upon the ground of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel. 
2. That defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff 
the sum of $396 per month as alimony, commencing in August 1987. 
Dated this / £ day of September 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
'SJ 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on this 10 day of September 1987, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, 
postate prepaid, to: 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Defendant 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
